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Cloud Outage Tracker: Major AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and Cloudflare Outages Since 2020

By Noah Grinstein20 min read
Cloud Outage Tracker: timeline of 62 major AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and Cloudflare outages from 2020 to 2026, sized by duration

Last updated: October 21, 2026. This tracker lists every major AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, and Cloudflare outage since January 2020, with each provider’s own stated duration, root cause, and source. It covers 62 major incidents. The median outage lasted 6h 12m, and the most common cause was a configuration or deployment change (20 of 62, 32%), not hardware failure.

We add new incidents as providers publish their post-incident reports. Control Plane publishes this tracker. Every row links to its source, usually the provider’s own post-mortem or status page, so you can verify it.

Key statistics

  • 62 major outages since 2020: AWS 14, Azure 20, Google Cloud 12, and Cloudflare 16.
  • Median duration: 6h 12m; mean 10h 01m across 55 completed incidents.
  • 32% were caused by configuration or deployment changes, and another 23% by software bugs or automation. Together, changes and code caused 55% of major outages.
  • 18% were caused by power or cooling failures, including the October 2026 Google Cloud London outage and the May 2026 AWS us-east-1 thermal event.
  • 9 of AWS’s 14 major outages hit us-east-1 (Northern Virginia), its oldest and largest region.
  • Two AWS regions have been disrupted since March 2026. Drone strikes damaged facilities in me-central-1 (UAE) and me-south-1 (Bahrain), AWS declared both unable to reliably support customer applications, and it has said some data stored only in those regions cannot be restored.
  • The longest completed outage in this tracker was Azure East US 2 in January 2025, at 50 hours 13 minutes.

The longest cloud outages in this tracker

ProviderDateRegionDuration
AWSMar 2, 2026me-south-1 (Bahrain)Ongoing (233+ days)
AWSMar 1, 2026me-central-1 (UAE)Ongoing (234+ days)
AzureJan 8-11, 2025East US 250h 13m
CloudflareNov 2-4, 2023Hillsboro, Oregon (control plane)40h 42m (most control plane back in 6h 14m)
Google CloudJul 19-20, 2022europe-west2 (London)38h 47m
AzureFeb 7-9, 2023Southeast Asia, East Asia32h 11m
Google CloudApr 25-26, 2023europe-west9 (Paris)27h 14m
AzureJul 18-19, 2024Central US24h 20m (storage fixed in 5h 15m)
AzureMay 29-30, 2026West US 222h 06m
AzureSep 26-27, 2025Switzerland North22h 05m (many customers back in 4h 06m)
AWSMay 7-8, 2026us-east-1 (N. Virginia), one AZ21h 30m to majority recovery
AzureFeb 7-8, 2026West US20h 26m

The two AWS Middle East regions are listed first because they have not fully recovered. Durations measure the provider’s full event window, from first customer impact to the last service back to normal; where the core fault cleared earlier, that figure is shown in parentheses.

What causes cloud outages

CauseIncidentsShare
Configuration or deployment change2032%
Software bug or automation1423%
Power or cooling1118%
Network46%
Capacity or overload46%
Physical damage35%
DNS35%
Not stated23%
Third-party dependency12%

Most major outages start with a change. A new configuration, a deployment, or an automated system acting on bad input accounts for 55% of the incidents here, including the November 2025 Cloudflare Bot Management failure and the October 2025 Azure Front Door outage. Physical events are rarer but last longer: power and cooling failures and the 2026 drone strikes produced several of the longest outages on record.

Outage duration by provider

ProviderMajor incidentsMedian durationMean duration
AWS147h 34m9h 32m
Azure208h 17m13h 35m
Google Cloud127h 27m11h 43m
Cloudflare161h 15m4h 35m

Counts reflect what each provider documents publicly, not underlying reliability. Microsoft publishes post-incident reviews for more events than other providers, and AWS publishes post-event summaries only for its largest incidents, so these numbers should not be read as a reliability ranking. Cloudflare’s incidents in this tracker are mostly edge and network events, which here recovered faster than regional compute outages.

Full incident log

Newest first. Every row links to its source: the provider’s official post-mortem where one exists, otherwise its status page or a credible news report.

DateProviderRegionDurationRoot causeSource
Oct 19-20, 2026Google Cloudeurope-west2 (London)7h 52mGoogle cites a power event in one London zone; a full analysis has not yet been published.Status page
Oct 19, 2026CloudflareGlobal (Cloudflare One)3h 12m (status page window)No post-mortem yet; the status page cites a Gateway traffic issue when identity policies are evaluated.Status page
Sep 30-Oct 1, 2026AzureMultiple regions5h 45mPaused gateway OS updates resumed at once while a recent change slowed config processing, overloading the regional networking control plane.Post-mortem
Sep 1, 2026Google Cloudus-central1 (Iowa)4h 11mA procedural error during a router upgrade unplugged every fiber path in a datacenter, isolating its compute from the network.Post-mortem
Aug 20, 2026Google Cloudus-west1 (Oregon)2h 22mPlanned fiber maintenance cut inter-datacenter capacity, rerouting failed, and congestion cascaded into Spanner and metadata latency.Post-mortem
Jul 23, 2026AzureWest US4h 57mA defect in automated repair tooling widened one optical-device repair to every optical device leaving a datacenter.Post-mortem
Jul 15-16, 2026Google Cloudeurope-west4 (Netherlands)14h 55mA brief utility voltage drop tripped both power feeds, a backup unit failed, and a cooling failure followed.Post-mortem
May 29-30, 2026AzureWest US 222h 06mLightning-driven voltage swings locked out cooling systems, and rising heat forced infrastructure shutdowns across two zones.Post-mortem
May 7-8, 2026AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia), one AZ21h 30m to majority recoveryA thermal event in one data center caused power loss, and servers shut down automatically when temperatures passed safe limits.Status page
Apr 24, 2026AzureEast US11h 52mLock contention in one partition of the networking control-plane service spread across zones as demand shifted.Post-mortem
Mar 2, 2026AWSme-south-1 (Bahrain)Ongoing (233+ days)A drone strike near an AWS facility caused physical and power damage that later spread across multiple AZs.Status page
Mar 1, 2026AWSme-central-1 (UAE)Ongoing (234+ days)Drone strikes hit two AWS facilities, causing structural, power, fire and water damage; AWS says some AZ data cannot be restored.Status page
Feb 20, 2026CloudflareGlobal (BYOIP customers)5h 07m (Cloudflare’s summary says 6h 07m)A broken sub-process in an Addressing API release withdrew about 1,100 customer BYOIP prefixes via BGP.Post-mortem
Feb 10, 2026AWSGlobal (CloudFront edge)1h 35m DNS errors (configuration propagation delays to 7h 48m)A faulty fleet of CloudFront DNS servers returned NXDOMAIN errors until AWS removed it from service.Status page
Feb 7-8, 2026AzureWest US20h 26mA transformer failure cut utility power and a control-system fault blocked the generator switch, draining UPS batteries.Post-mortem
Feb 2-3, 2026AzureMultiple regions~6h 27mA policy remediation wrongly disabled anonymous access on Microsoft storage accounts that hold VM extension packages.Post-mortem
Jan 22, 2026CloudflareMiami (IPv6)25mA routing-policy automation bug on a Miami router leaked peer routes to other peers and providers.Post-mortem
Jan 8, 2026CloudflareGlobal (1.1.1.1 resolver)Not statedA memory-saving cache change moved CNAME records to the end of DNS answers, breaking clients that expect them first.Post-mortem
Dec 5, 2025CloudflareGlobal (about 28% of HTTP traffic)25mA WAF change to mitigate a React vulnerability hit a Lua nil-value bug in the older proxy.Post-mortem
Nov 18, 2025CloudflareGlobal5h 46m (core traffic restored in 3h 10m)A database permissions change doubled the Bot Management feature file past a size limit, crashing traffic-routing software network-wide.Post-mortem
Oct 29-30, 2025AzureGlobal8h 24mCustomer config changes across two control-plane versions produced incompatible metadata that crashed Front Door edge servers worldwide.Post-mortem
Oct 28, 2025AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia)13h 43mAWS did not state a cause; it reported higher EC2 launch latency in one AZ and impaired ECS cells.Status page
Oct 19-20, 2025AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia)14h 32mA latent race condition in DynamoDB’s automated DNS management left the regional endpoint with an empty DNS record that automation could not repair.Post-mortem
Oct 9, 2025AzureAfrica, Europe, APAC, Middle East8h 10m (availability restored in 5h 00m)During a manual cleanup of bad Front Door metadata, engineers bypassed the protection layer and the metadata reached edge servers.Post-mortem
Sep 26-27, 2025AzureSwitzerland North22h 05m (many customers back in 4h 06m)A malformed certificate in a load balancer config change was pushed to all zones at once through an expedited path.Post-mortem
Sep 12, 2025CloudflareGlobal (control plane)1h 15mA dashboard bug flooded the Tenant Service API during its redeploy, breaking API authorization.Post-mortem
Aug 21, 2025CloudflareLinks to AWS us-east-13h 51m including lingering latency (core 3h 11m)One customer’s request surge from AWS us-east-1 saturated Cloudflare’s direct links to that region.Post-mortem
Jul 14, 2025CloudflareGlobal (1.1.1.1 resolver)1h 02mA misconfiguration in legacy service-topology systems withdrew the 1.1.1.1 prefixes from the Internet.Post-mortem
Jun 12, 2025Google CloudGlobal7h 27m (core API errors 3h 00m)A policy change with blank fields replicated globally and hit an unguarded null-pointer path in new quota code, crash-looping API management.Post-mortem
Jun 12, 2025CloudflareGlobal2h 36m (Cloudflare’s summary says 2h 28m)Workers KV’s storage backend, partly hosted on a third-party cloud provider, failed when that provider had an outage.Post-mortem
Mar 29, 2025Google Cloudus-east5 (Columbus)About 6h (per The Register)Utility power was lost and UPS batteries failed, so engineers bypassed the UPS to restore generator power.News report
Mar 21, 2025CloudflareGlobal1h 07mDuring a credential rotation, new R2 credentials went to a dev instance and the old ones were deleted.Post-mortem
Feb 6, 2025CloudflareGlobal59mWhile handling a phishing report, an operator disabled the production R2 Gateway service instead of a single bucket.Post-mortem
Jan 8-11, 2025AzureEast US 250h 13mWhile enabling a feature, networking PubSub replicas were recycled in parallel, breaking quorum and losing index data.Post-mortem
Nov 13, 2024AzureAbout 34 regions11h 40mA decommissioning job deleted Traffic Manager profiles for live storage accounts because subscription ownership was misassigned.Post-mortem
Oct 24, 2024Google Cloudeurope-west3 (Frankfurt)12h 39mA power failure and cooling problem forced parts of one Frankfurt zone to power down.News report
Jul 30, 2024AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia)6h 52mA new Kinesis cell-management system mishandled a cell with many low-throughput shards, marking healthy hosts unhealthy and overloading connection provisioning.Post-mortem
Jul 30, 2024AzureGlobal (multiple regions)7h 58m (main impact 2h 13m)After a DDoS mitigation, a site power issue and latent network misconfiguration routed traffic through congested European scrubbing systems.Post-mortem
Jul 18-19, 2024AzureCentral US24h 20m (storage fixed in 5h 15m)An incomplete storage allow list was published region-wide, so storage rejected disk I/O from many VM hosts.Post-mortem
May 2024Google CloudAustralia (single customer, GCVE)Not stated (about a week, per The Register)A misconfiguration during provisioning of UniSuper’s private cloud triggered an unknown bug that deleted it, per Google.News report
Jan 21, 2024AzureMultiple regions7h 28mA latent bug in an old Azure Resource Manager preview feature crashed ARM nodes on startup after an internal config change.Post-mortem
Nov 2-4, 2023CloudflareHillsboro, Oregon (control plane)40h 42m (most control plane back in 6h 14m)Utility problems, a ground fault and generator failures cut power to a data center hosting control-plane services not in the HA cluster.Post-mortem
Oct 30, 2023CloudflareGlobal37mA bug in a new Workers KV deployment tool sent production traffic to a staging build, returning errors to dependent services.Post-mortem
Jun 13, 2023AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia)3h 48mLambda Frontend scaling crossed a never-reached capacity threshold in one cell, triggering a latent defect that left execution environments unused.Post-mortem
Apr 25-26, 2023Google Cloudeurope-west9 (Paris)27h 14mA cooling water leak flooded a UPS room and started a fire, and the building shutdown took the region’s control plane down.Post-mortem
Feb 7-9, 2023AzureSoutheast Asia, East Asia32h 11mA voltage dip tripped chillers in one zone, forcing shutdowns, and regional failover and ARM dependencies also failed.Post-mortem
Jan 25, 2023AzureGlobal (WAN)5h 35m (most regions back in 1h 57m)An untested router command, on one vendor’s hardware, forced every WAN router to recompute routing at once.Post-mortem
Jul 19-20, 2022Google Cloudeurope-west2 (London)38h 47mRedundant cooling systems failed together during record UK heat, so Google powered down part of a zone.Post-mortem
Jun 21, 2022Cloudflare19 busiest data centers1h 15mA BGP policy change with reordered terms withdrew critical prefixes in the newest data center architecture.Post-mortem
Dec 22, 2021AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia), one AZNot stated (power restored after 1h 04m)A power outage hit one Availability Zone, and some hardware could not be recovered.News report
Dec 16, 2021AzureGlobal1h 25mAn OS update made a backend Azure AD auth service unresponsive, and a circuit-breaker bug spread the failure.Post-mortem
Dec 15, 2021AWSus-west-1, us-west-245mAWS traffic engineering moved too much traffic onto parts of its backbone, congesting links to some ISPs.News report
Dec 7, 2021AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia)11h 10m to last service (core 6h 52m)An automated scaling activity caused a connection surge that overwhelmed devices linking AWS’s internal network to its main network.Post-mortem
Nov 16, 2021Google CloudGlobal1h 54mA latent race-condition bug in the config pipeline pushed a corrupted configuration file to Cloud Load Balancing.Post-mortem
Sep 26-27, 2021AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia), one AZ7h 34mResource contention degraded the EBS subsystem that coordinates storage hosts, leaving I/O stuck.News report
Sep 2, 2021AWSap-northeast-1 (Tokyo)6h 12mA latent network-device OS bug, triggered by a specific customer packet pattern, made devices in one Direct Connect layer fail.Post-mortem
Apr 1, 2021AzureGlobal1h 09m to most services (DNS resolution core 39m)A global DNS query surge exposed a code defect in Azure DNS edge caches, and client retries added load.Post-mortem
Mar 15-16, 2021AzureGlobal14h 37m (Azure AD fixed in 2h 05m)Key-cleanup automation ignored a retain flag and removed an Azure AD signing key still in use.Post-mortem
Dec 14, 2020Google CloudGlobal47mAn automated quota system cut the authentication service’s storage quota to near zero after an incomplete migration reported zero usage.Post-mortem
Nov 25, 2020AWSus-east-1 (N. Virginia)17h 08mAdded Kinesis front-end capacity pushed every server past an OS thread limit, so servers could not build shard maps or route requests.Post-mortem
Sep 28-29, 2020AzureGlobalAbout 5h 00m including tail (core about 2h 58m)A defect in Azure AD’s safe-deployment system sent a crashing update straight to production.Post-mortem
Jul 17, 2020Cloudflare20 backbone locations27mA one-line router config change in Atlanta leaked BGP routes and pulled all backbone traffic to Atlanta, overloading it.Post-mortem

The cost of cloud downtime

Downtime costs vary widely by company size and how much revenue runs through the affected system. These figures come from the publishers’ own reports:

  • 57% / 1 in 5: 57% of operators said their most recent major outage cost more than $100,000; for the second consecutive year, 1 in 5 reported costs above $1 million. (Uptime Institute, Annual Outage Analysis 2026 (figures from its 2025 survey), 2026)
  • $1.85M per hour: High-impact business outages cost respondents an average of $1.85 million per hour, over $30,000 a minute; the annualized cost of high-impact outages was $73.5M in 2026, down from $76M in 2025. (New Relic, 2026 Observability Forecast, 2026) Respondents skew toward large enterprises.
  • $400B a year: Downtime costs Global 2000 companies $400 billion annually, or 9% of profits. (Splunk and Oxford Economics, The Hidden Costs of Downtime, 2024) Covers all downtime, including security incidents (56%), not only cloud outages.
  • >$300,000 per hour: One hour of downtime costs more than $300,000 for over 90% of mid-size and large enterprises; 41% put it at $1 million to over $5 million. (ITIC, 2024 Hourly Cost of Downtime, 2024) Self-reported estimates; excludes litigation and penalties.
  • $500M to $650M: The October 20, 2025 AWS us-east-1 outage caused an estimated $500 million to $650 million in financial losses for US companies. (Parametrix, 2025) An economic-loss estimate; not comparable with CyberCube’s insured-loss figure below.
  • $38M to $581M: Preliminary insured-loss estimate for the October 2025 AWS outage is $38 million to $581 million, with most outcomes expected at the lower end. (CyberCube, 2025) Insurance-loss view, not total economic loss.
  • $5.4B: The July 19, 2024 CrowdStrike outage caused an estimated $5.4 billion in direct losses for the US Fortune 500 excluding Microsoft; insured losses $0.54 billion to $1.08 billion. (Parametrix, 2024) A faulty endpoint security update, not a cloud provider outage.

How to estimate your own cost per minute

Cost per minute = (R × A × L) + (S + E) + C

  • R: Revenue per minute = annual revenue routed through the affected system ÷ 525,600
  • A: Share of revenue affected by the outage (0 to 1)
  • L: Share of affected revenue actually lost, not just delayed (0 to 1)
  • S: Staff cost per minute = people pulled into the incident × fully loaded hourly cost ÷ 60
  • E: Idle-employee cost per minute = employees unable to work × fully loaded hourly cost ÷ 60 × productivity lost (0 to 1)
  • C: SLA credits and penalties owed to customers, per minute of breach

Total outage cost = cost per minute × outage minutes + one-time costs (remediation, overtime, customer make-goods, regulatory fines). Use revenue that flows through the affected system, not total company revenue. L matters: some revenue is recovered when customers retry, some is gone. SLA credits are usually a percentage of the monthly bill; convert to a per-minute equivalent or add as a lump sum. Excludes churn, brand damage and stock price impact.

Hypothetical example, for illustration only: A hypothetical SaaS company with $50M annual revenue, all through one production app, during a 180-minute regional cloud outage.

InputValuePer minute
R: revenue per minute$50,000,000 ÷ 525,600$95.13
A: share of revenue affected80%
L: share of affected revenue lost50%
Lost revenue (R × A × L)$95.13 × 0.8 × 0.5$38.05
S: response staff12 engineers × $120/hr ÷ 60$24.00
E: idle employees150 staff × $70/hr ÷ 60 × 30%$52.50
C: SLA credits owed$30,000 ÷ 180 minutes$166.67
Cost per minute$281.22
Total for 180 minutes$50,620

Far below survey averages because those skew to large enterprises; plug in your own revenue, headcount and contract terms.

How teams stay online when a cloud region fails

The incidents above share a pattern: an application running in one region, or depending on services anchored in one region, goes down with it. Applications that run in more than one location at the same time can move traffic to a healthy location without a manual cutover.

  • Run active-active, not warm standby. A standby that never serves real traffic is untested until the outage.
  • Find single-region dependencies. Identity, DNS, secrets, CI/CD, and observability often live in one region even when the application does not.
  • Plan for the data layer. Choose replication per service based on how much inconsistency it can tolerate.
  • Use health-checked global routing instead of manual DNS changes, with safeguards so automation cannot remove too much capacity at once.

During the October 2025 AWS us-east-1 outage, 20% of Control Plane customers had us-east-1 in their Global Virtual Clouds. Their workloads were active and running in healthy locations within 10 seconds, with no customer downtime, according to Control Plane internal incident telemetry. The 99.999% availability SLA applies to workloads running at least two replicas in at least two locations. For a comparison of approaches, see the best multi-cloud and multi-region failover solutions.

Methodology

  • Scope: major incidents at AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, and Cloudflare from January 1, 2020 to October 21, 2026. Major means multi-hour regional impact, global impact, or broad downstream disruption. For Azure, which documents far more incidents, we include the 20 with the broadest impact.
  • Sources: AWS Post-Event Summaries and Health Dashboard history, Azure Post Incident Reviews, Google Cloud incident reports, and Cloudflare post-mortems. Where no provider report exists, the row cites a credible news report and is marked as such.
  • Durations are computed from the provider’s own start and end times. Where a provider’s summary and timeline disagree, we use the timeline and note the difference.
  • Root causes are paraphrased from the provider’s own report.
  • Coverage: recent years are better documented because some status histories only keep a limited window, so year-over-year counts understate earlier years.
  • Updates: we add incidents after providers publish reports. Corrections are welcome through the Control Plane team.

FAQ

How often does AWS go down?

This tracker records 14 major AWS outages since January 2020, 9 of them in us-east-1. AWS publishes post-event summaries only for its largest incidents, and smaller regional disruptions happen more often.

What was the longest AWS outage?

The longest is ongoing: AWS’s me-central-1 (UAE) and me-south-1 (Bahrain) regions have been disrupted since March 2026 after drone strikes damaged facilities, and AWS has said both cannot reliably support customer applications. Among completed AWS incidents, the May 7-8, 2026 us-east-1 thermal event ran 21 hours 30 minutes to majority recovery, and the November 25, 2020 Kinesis outage lasted 17 hours 8 minutes.

What caused the October 2025 AWS outage?

AWS says a latent race condition in DynamoDB’s automated DNS management left the us-east-1 regional endpoint with an empty DNS record that automation could not repair. The event ran from 11:48 PM PDT on October 19 to 2:20 PM PDT on October 20, 2025, a total of 14 hours 32 minutes.

What caused the October 2025 Azure outage?

Microsoft says customer configuration changes processed across two control-plane versions produced incompatible metadata that crashed Azure Front Door edge servers worldwide on October 29, 2025. The outage lasted 8 hours 24 minutes and affected Front Door, CDN, the Azure portal, Entra ID, and Microsoft 365.

What happened in the Google Cloud London outage in October 2026?

Google Cloud reported a power event in one europe-west2 (London) zone, with elevated errors for some regional services, for 7 hours 52 minutes, according to its status page. Google had not yet published a full incident report.

What causes most cloud outages?

Changes. In this tracker, 32% of major outages came from configuration or deployment changes and 23% from software bugs or automation, while 18% came from power or cooling failures.

Is us-east-1 less reliable than other AWS regions?

9 of the 14 major AWS outages in this tracker were in us-east-1. It is AWS’s oldest and largest region and hosts some global control-plane functions, so its incidents have wider impact, but region size and traffic also explain part of the count.

How much does cloud downtime cost?

Uptime Institute’s 2026 analysis found 57% of operators said their most recent major outage cost more than $100,000, and New Relic’s 2026 survey put high-impact outages at $1.85 million per hour. Parametrix estimated the October 2025 AWS outage cost US companies $500 million to $650 million.

How can I protect my application from a cloud outage?

Run the application active-active in at least two regions or providers, remove single-region dependencies such as identity and DNS, choose a data replication pattern per service, and use health-checked global routing so traffic moves without a manual cutover.